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Abstract 
Presidents and Prime Ministers: United Kingdom — United States: 'Special 
Relationship' during the 1960's 
Melissa S. Thompson, (Dr. R. J. Q. Adams) University Undergraduate Fellow, 1998- 
1999, Texas A&M University, Department of History 
The primary focus of the paper is upon the political nature of the relationship, 
specifically the role of the political actors and highest political o Aices. The designated 
time period of the paper necessitates beginning in the midst of political terms of office 
rather than at the commencement of terms. However, this affords a unique examination 
of the relationship over a definable time period rather than an overview of particular 
political careers. 
The secondary focus of the paper is to determine a specific definition of the 
special relationship. Although the definition of the term special relationship is crucial to 
comprehension of the importance of the political relationship, a large majority of British 
and American scholars have neglected to define the term. The questions that have shaped 
the paper are as follows. 
What is the relationship that has been maintained between the United States and 
the United Kingdom? Who has maintained the relationship? Why is the "Special 
Relationship" so special? Where is this relationship taking the United States and the 
United Kingdom? Answers to these questions are highly relevant and necessary to 
understanding our significance as Americans, Britons and citizens of a global 
community. 
The special relationship between Britain and the United States has its origins in the 
establishment of the United States as a republic. The name 'special relationship' for the relations 
between the United States and the United Kingdom was first employed in nineteen forty-six by 
Sir Winston Churchill. That relationship has been the subject of many debates, books, articles, 
political activities and private discussions. However, the relationship between our two countries 
is a unique one that continues to puzzle and mystify those of us who try to define it. In legal and 
historical records, the relationship is a warm one but in the unwritten codes of this relationship, it 
is more than warm, it is truly speciaL It is difficult to categorize or delineate all the nuances and 
meanings of the relationship because it is one that is experienced on the level of the most brazen 
traveler to the most diplomatic intelligence officer, the most experienced business man to the 
most timid exchange student, and on the level of common men and highest political actors. The 
relationship has occasionally been used to manipulate and contrive policy to serve one side over 
another but the relationship has also been used to forge a legendary Iriendship. 
This paper will determine whether the relationship between the United States and the 
United Kingdom during the nineteen sixties was an independent or an interdependent one. The 
series of questions developed and used are as follows. What is the relationship that has been 
maintained between the United States and the United Kingdom? Who has maintained the 
relationship? Why is what Winston Churchill termed the "Special Relationship" so special? 
' 
Where is this relationship taking the United States and the United Kingdom? Answers to these 
and other questions are highly relevant and necessary to understanding our significance as 
Americans, Britons, and citizens of a global community. Understanding this historical 
' Hitcheus, Christopher. Blood, Class and Nostalgia, Anglo-American Ironies. London: Chatto & Windus, 1990, pp. 
21. 
relationship is also a prerequisite for comprehending the present relationship and for 
prognosticating the future role of this relationship in determining independent state policy and 
action. 
The primary focus of this paper is upon the political nature of the relationship, 
specifically the role of the politicians and highest political offices. The designated time period of 
this paper necessitates beginning in the midst of political terms of office rather than at the 
commencement of terms. However, this affords a unique examination of the relationship over a 
definable time period rather than a synopsis of particular political careers. The secondary focus 
of the paper is to determine a specific definition or a pinpointing of the essence of the special 
relationship. The definition of the special relationship is relegated to a secondary focus only due 
to the amount of coverage in this paper, not to importance. Although the definition of the term 
special relationship is crucial to comprehension of the importance of the political relationship, a 
large majority o f British and American scholars have neglected to define the term. This leaves 
audiences confused and unable to accurately compare one set of findings to another. 
What is the 'special relationship'? A large number of books have been written in an 
effort to explain how the relationship was formed, about its health, how it faired during times of 
crises, and how it helps 'us' versus 'them', or 'them' versus 'us'. Nevertheless, it is difficult 
to 
compare all these works without a clear definition of the term. To one, it may mean political 
leaders on speaking terms and good educational exchanges but to another, it may mean close 
military cooperation and coordination of foreign diplomacy. The 1996 British Collins English 
Dictionary defines 'special' as an adjective meaning, "1 distinguished trom or better than others 
of its kind. . . 2 designed or reserved for a specific purpose. . . 3 not usual, different &om 
normal. . . 4 particular or primary. . . . " The 1968 American Random House Dictionary of the 
English Language defines 'special' as an adjective meaning, "l. of a distinct or particular kind or 
character. . . . 2. having a particular function, purpose, application, etc. . . , 3. dealing with 
particulars; specific. . . . 4. distinguished or different &om what is ordinary or usual. . . . 5. 
extraordinary; exceptional. . . . " 
These definitions point to an understanding of ' special' that includes more than perhaps 
most scholars have considered. In order discern the meaning and significance of the term 
'special relationship' scholars must appreciate that the term 'special relationship' includes all 
aspects of the relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States. The meaning of 
the special relationship cannot be limited to one or two major areas such as politics and business 
but must include the understanding that the relationship is infused with cultural relationships and 
meanings as well as business, economic, and political nuances at all levels. This broad inclusion 
lends itself to Christopher Hitchens' statement that, "The 'special relationship' is something that 
is supposed to elude definition; supposed to be protean and vague, [Emphasis in original]" 
However he further states that, "Its real roots and character are to be sought in the grand triad of 
race, class, and empire — the trivium upon which the relationship rests. 
" Alex Danchev provides 
a list of ten distinguishing features, ranked in order of importance, of the special relationship: 
transparency, informality, generality, reciprocity, exclusivity, clandestinity, reliability, durability, 
potentiality, and mythicizability. Both of these authors intuitively recognize the significance of 
the relationship but are relegated to listing attributes to define it. These lists long or short, are 
merely lists and still do not provide a clear definition of the special relationship. A definition of 
' Collins Paperback English Dictionary. Wrotham, England: HarperCollins, 1996, pp. 791. 
' The Random House Dictionary of the English Language, College Edition, New York; Random House, 1968, pp. 
1261. 
Hitcheos. Blood, Class and Nostalgia, Anglo-American Ironies. pp. 21. 
the special relationship is to be found in the people of Britain and the United States. We are the 
ones who read, remember, experience, write, talk, and carry on the historical precedent between 
our two nations. We make the relationship special because we choose to relate to one another 
on 
terms that are friendlier and more considerate than our relations with other nations and peoples. 
Who maintained this relationship? This paper is focused primarily upon the highest 
political actors in the relationship therefore the people discussed were Presidents or Prime 
Ministers during the nineteen sixties. There were four American Presidents during the decade of 
the sixties: Dwight Eisenhower, John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, and Richard Nixon and three 
British Prime Ministers: Harold Macmillan, Sir Alee Douglas-Home, and Harold Wilson. See 
the Appendix for a cross listing of Presidents and Prime Ministers. 
The beginning of the nineteen sixties saw President Eisenhower's term drawing to a close 
and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan firmly ensconced in office. Relations between the two 
heads of state and the two countries were very amiable. It is well known that the President and 
the Prime Minister were on a first name basis and exchanged many letters. Shortly aller 
Macmillan's visit to Camp David and Eisenhower's agreement that the United States would 
provide the United Kingdom with Skybolt missiles, Macmillan sent Eisenhower a telegram on 
March 31, 1960. In the telegram he stated, "I find it hard to express in the form of a letter how 
much I valued our talks over the last few days and how grateful I am to you for all your kindness 
and hospitality. " Macmillan further stated, "I believe that this last meeting has been one o f the 
most &uitful which we have had together and I am so much comforted to feel that our thoughts 
iiitchens. Blood, Class and Nostalgia, Anglo-American Ironies. pp. 21 
' Danchev, Alex. On Specialness, Essays in Anglo-American Relations. London: Macmigau Press LTD, 1998, pp. 6. 
' Public Record OAice. (Subsequently PRO). PREM 11/2994. "Prime Minister's Personal Telegram. 
" 3 1 March 
1960. 
are in line on so many subjects. " The hospitality and kindness extended to Macmillan was a 
genuine expression &om Eisenhower. After Eisenhower's rethement to private life, they 
continued to write and attempt to arrange visits with each other. 
Perhaps the best indicators of the significance or importance these two men placed on 
their &iendship are the last few letters they exchanged as Eisenhower was leaving office. In a 
letter dated January 13, 1961, Macmillan wrote Eisenhower, 
Whether we agreed or disagreed on particular policies we 
had I think a deep unity of purpose and, I like to feel, a &ank 
and honest appreciation of each other's good faith. It has 
certainly been an enormous help to me to know that we had 
these relations of complete confidence. This was something 
which one does not, alas, often find between Heads of 
Government even allied countries; personal friendship and 
trust cannot be manufactured, they just grow. ' 
Eisenhower replied on January 19, 1961, "But on the brighter side, I take with me many happy 
memories which I know will brighten the future. One of the greatest of these is the satisfaction 
stemming &om the close relationship which has existed between us. . . 
"' He further stated, "I 
thank you for making this possible, and I feel more at ease knowing that you are still at the 
helm 
of our oldest and most trusted ally. "" These short excerpts show how much the men respected 
each other and how special the relationship was between them and between our two nations. 
' PRO. PREM 11/2994. "Prime Minister's Personal Telegram. 
" 31 March 1960. 
' PRO. PREM 11/3606. "Letter tiom Macmillan to Eisenhower. 
" 13 January 61. 
" PRO. PREM 11/3606. "Letter 1'rom Eisenhower to Macmillan. 
" 19 January 61. 
" PRO. PREM 11/3606. "Letter 1'rom Eisenhower to Macmillan. 
" 19 January 61. 
These letters and the telegram also point to a large degree of interdependence, one nation helping 
the other, rather than independence from each other. 
President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan also had a close relationship. D. 
Cameron Watt describes it well. 
The opening bars in the Macmillan-Kennedy concerto. . . 
were cautious and tentative. Mutual trials, like 
Krushchev's brutal mauling of an inexperienced Kennedy 
in Vienna and the Berlin crisis of 1961, gradually brought 
them together. Following the disastrous Vienna encounter, 
Kennedy was suffering additionally with acute back pain. 
Macmillan, aided by his highly developed political antennae, 
immediately got it right by taking the President, informally, 
up to his study for a drink. Kennedy came to rely on the 
wisdom of his counsels. . . ' 
Macmillan did not simply fall into this position of elder statesman to the younger Kennedy; it 
was a calculated maneuver designed to continue the close relationship between the two countries. 
In a Prime Minister's Personal Minute addressed to the Foreign Secretary on November 9, 1960, 
Macmillan observes, "I must somehow convince him [Kennedy] that I am worth consulting not 
as an old friend (as Eisenhower felt) but as a man who, although of advancing years, has young 
and fresh thoughts [Parenthesis in original, brackets added]. 
"' The same day Macmillan sent a 
congratulatory telegram to President-elect Kennedy. In it he stated, "I look forward to working 
Watt, D. Cameron. "Demythologizing the Eisenhower Era. 
" in The 'Special Relationship ', Anglo-American 
Relations Since 1945. Eds. Roger Louis and Hedley Bull. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989, pp. 91. 
PRO. PREM 11/3599. "Prime Minister's Personal Minute. 
" addressed to the Foreign Secretary. 9 November 
1 960. 
with you in the causes which the people of this country and of the United States both hold so 
dear. "' Macmillan was still searching for the best way to approach Kennedy but heeded his 
advisors not to rush the matter. 
On December 19, 1960, Macmillan sent an eight page telegram to Kennedy and in 
closing he wrote, "I am sure that the fundamental interests of our two countries are identical and 
that, when our policies are harmonised, they stand a better chance of success. I can assure you 
that we in this country will not shrink Irom sacrifice, nor I believe have we lost our power to 
think and act imaginatively in the great crisis of our time. 
"" Kennedy's December 31, 1960, 
letter in response to the Prime Minister's telegram was a significant one in that it demonstrated 
his recognition of the importance of the relationship and that the relationship was not one-sided 
on the part of the British. Kennedy stated, 
I realize that given our close relations and the nature and 
circumstances of our two countries our policies are broadly 
in harmony. But I too believe that we must 'rethink urgently 
and radically' as you so well put it. Further, I would hope 
that our two Governments could work out with some precision 
the details of policy which are important to close cooperation. 
Britain has enormous capacity to play a major role in the 
shaping o f events and to help recapture the initiative in the 
struggle for fieedom. ' 
After Kennedy's inauguration, Macmillan sent him another telegram and among other 
things, stated, "May I add what a great impression your inaugural speech has made in this 
" PRO. PREM 11/3599. "Prime Minister's Personal Telegram. 
" sent to Senator John Kennedy. 9 November 1960. 
" PRO. PREM 1 1/3326. "Prime Minister's Personal Telegram. 
" sent to Mr. Kennedy. 19 December 1960, pp. 7-8. 
country. We were particularly struck by your phrase about considering what the United States 
and other countries can together do for the &eedom of man. 
"' Macmillan was continuing his 
&iendly overtures to draw Kennedy into a personal &iendship without being condescending. 
Kennedy may have been a young world leader, but he certainly was no fooL The decision to 
continue the special relationship at the presidential level was his. In a February 19, 1961, 
telegram to Kennedy, Macmillan wrote, "I write to thank you for your letter of February 6 about 
the continuance of Anglo-United States understandings concerning consultation before the use of 
nuclear weapons, and the use of bases in the United Kingdom. 
"' Macmillan continued, "I also 
greatly value, especially in this context, your reference to the intimacy with which our 
countries 
work together. "' 
President Kennedy was almost immediately con&onted with the decision on whether to 
provide aid or not to the French in their nuclear program This was a situation of great interest to 
Macmillan because the U. S. was helping Britain at the time. Kennedy was &ustrated in talks 
with de Gaulle and turned to Macmillan for suggestions and ideas. In a telegram on May 8, 
1961, Kennedy stated, "I may send you further thoughts on the other useful and interesting 
proposals in your letter. Again, let me tell you how grateful I am for your wise council. 
" 
Kennedy chose not to aid the French, but again, that decision was his and Macmillan only served 
as a sounding board. D. Cameron Watt suggests that, "Much has been written about this 'Special 
Relationship within the Special Relationship, 
' the personal I'riendship, nay, affection for each 
"PRO. PREM 11/3599. "Letter hom John F. Kennedy, Senator, to Mr. Macmillan. 
" 31 December 1960. 
PRO. PREM 11/4052. "Prime Minister's Personal Telegram. 
" sent to the President of the United States. 23 
January 1961, pp. 1-2. 
PRO. PREM 11/4052. "Prime Minister's Personal Telegram. 
" sent to the President of the United States. 19 
February 1961. 
PRO. PREM 11/4052. "Prime Minister's Personal Telegram. 
" sent to the President of the United States. 19 
February 1961. 
" PRO. PREM 11/3314. "Prime Minister's Personal Telegram. 
" sent to the Prime Minister &om John F. Kennedy. 8 
May 1961. 
other that grew between President and Prime Minister, and it and its impact on events should 
never be underestimated. " ' 
John Dickie also confirms the close relationship between Kennedy and Macmillan, 
"No 
differences of opinion or age prevented the two leaders from getting along famously. A fondness 
developed between them which went beyond the necessities of alliance. 
" The &iendship 
between Macmillan and Kennedy has been compared to Wilson and Churchill during the war 
because of the cordiality and genuineness they shared; they enjoyed more than just a business or 
political Iriendliness. In September 1961, the retiring British Ambassador to Washington, Sir 
Harold Caccia, was quoted in The Times, London as saying that, ". . . Britain and the United 
States were so closely involved with each other that, 'the discomfiture of one of us diminishes 
the other'. " ' Kennedy and Macmillan met four times in 1961, Another important part o f the 
closeness between the two men was David Ormsby-Gore, who replaced Sir Caccia as the British 
Ambassador to Washington. He was a long-standing Iriend o f Kennedy and his family and 
according to Alan Dobson he, ". . . had privileged access. . . 
" to Kennedy. Ormsby-Gore was 
included in some family holidays and could advise Kennedy of British positions or opinions with 
much greater ease than previous ambassadors. 
Sir Alee Douglas-Home became the new Prime Minister in October 1963, and Lyndon 
Johnson became President following Kennedy's assassination in November 1963. The new 
President and Prime Minister met briefly on November 26 and a record of the conversation 
indicates that, ". . . he [Johnson] repeatedly expressed his sincere wish to work closely with 
Britain over all world problems and his determination to maintain the foreign policies of 
" Watt, D. Cameron. "Demythologizing the Eisenhower Era", in The 'Special Relationship', Anglo-American 
Relations Since 1945. pp. 91. 
' Dickie, John. 'Special'No More, Anglo-American Relationship: Rhetoric and Reality. London: 
Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, 1994, pp. 105. 
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President Kennedy which he fully endorsed. " Johnson followed up this sentiment of 
cooperation in his letter of December 1, 1963. He wrote, "This brings my warmest thanks for 
your message of sympathy on the death of President Kennedy. He had the strongest sense of the 
indispensable connection that binds our two countries, and for this reason our government and 
people have felt comfort from your presence. . . in recent days, 
" He further emphasized the 
importance of the special relationship by stating, "I know full well Iiom years of experience that 
almost everywhere in the world our interests and concerns are intertwined. 
" 
Johnson and Douglas-Home met in Washington in February 1964, and in his welcoming 
remarks printed in the New York Times, Johnson stated, ". . . There is between our two countries 
the invisible cords of a mingled respect and understanding and affection, much as two brothers 
who may differ but whose ties are too strong to ever break. 
" Johnson again emphasized the 
significance of the relationship and he stated something crucial to understanding the relationship, 
the ' ties are too strong to ever break'. Douglas-Home echoed the sentiment when he replied, 
"I 
would once more only say that anything that I can do in our talks and my Government can do to 
help to keep the relations between Britain and the United States close and harmonious will be 
done with the full support of all our countrymen. *' This was a very public affirmation of the 
importance of the relationship and demonstrated the esteem with which the two men held it. 
Douglas-Home again stressed the sense of the importance of the relationship in a telegram on 
February 14, 1964, He stated, "Our talks have not only carried on a sound tradition but achieved 
" "Sir H. Caccia on Anglo-U. S. Bonds. " The Times, London 22 September 1961, pp. 10. 
Dobson, Alan P. Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieih Century. London: Routledge, 1995, pp. 125. 
" PRO. PREM 11/4790. "Record of a conversation between the Prime Minister and President Lyndon Johnson at 
the White House from 10 a. m. to 10:30 a. m. on Tuesday, November 26. 
" 26 November 1963. 
" PRO. PREM 11/5189. "Letter to Mr. Prime Minister. " from Lyndon B. Johnson. 1 December 1963. 
' PRO. PREM 11/5189. "Letter to Mr. Prime Minister. 
" tiom Lyndon B. Johnson. 1 December 1963. 
" 
"President's Welcome and the Prime Minister's Reply. " The New York Times February 13, 1964, pp. 3. 
' 
"President's Welcome and the Prime Minister's Reply. " The New York Times February 13, 1964, pp. 3. 
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a real meeting of minds. " He continued, "On the personal level I like to think that from now on 
our agreements will be under-pinned by mutual trust and any disagreement softened by 
&iendship and mutual understanding. 
" ' 
Harold Wilson succeeded Douglas-Home as Prime Minister in October of 1964, and 
Johnson immediately sent a congratulatory note. Johnson wrote, "I look forward to the 
continuation of the close and &iendly cooperation, based on mutual confidence and respect, 
which has bound our countries so closely for so long. 
" Wilson responded the next day, "I was 
particularly glad to see what you said about relations between the United States and Britain and 
this gives me a chance, on my side, to assure you that my colleagues and I are convinced that 
close &iendship and co-operation between us is just as essential now as it has been in the past. 
"' 
Wilson's first trip abroad as Prime Minister was to the United States. A New York Times 
editorial stated, "From the beginning of his leadership Mr. Wilson has insisted that close British- 
American relations must be key to his policies. . . 
**' However, as early as March 1963, Wilson 
was quoted in The New York Times as stating that he, ". . . wants no 'special relationship' with 
the United States and believes that the 'natural relationship' of a community of interests will 
suAice to safeguard the links between the two countries. 
" Baylis counters that this, ". . . change 
in the description of the relationship. . . was more verbal than substantive. 
"' Baylis maintains 
that the relationship was vital to Wilson and to his Government. 
' 
PRO. PREM 11/5199. "Telegram to the President. 
" tram the Prime Minister. 14 February 1964. 
" PRO. PREM 11/5199. 'Telegram to the President" from the Prime Minister. 14 February 1964. 
PRO. PREM, 13/103. "Letter to the Prime Minister. 
" trom f. yndon B. Johnson. 16 October 1964. 
" PRO. PREM, 13/103. "Prime Minister's Personal Telegram. 
" to the President. 17 October 1964. 
" Gruson, Sydney. "Wilson Charts New British Course. 
" The New York Times December 20, 1964, sec. 4: 4. 
" Gruson, Sydney, "Harold Wilson: Lucky and Skillful, 
" The New York Times March 30, 1963, pp. 3. 
Baylis, John. Anglo-American Defence Relations 1939-1984, The Special Relationship, London: Macmillan, 
1984, pp. 152. 
Baylis. Anglo-American Defence Relations 1939-1984, The Special Relationship. pp. 152. 
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The question of British membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) was 
increasingly a perplexing and difficult area for Wilson. The British were over-extended in world 
military commitments and experiencing economic troubles at home. The apparent difficulty to 
Britain joining the European Community lay in Furopean, specifically French, concerns about 
the special relationship with the United States. "In vetoing the British application for 
membership [in the EEC] in 1963, and repeatedly since, General de Gaulle has indicated that the 
close relationship between the two 'Anglo-Saxon' countries is a major obstacle. 
" There was 
fear that Britain would serve as an American interest in the Community. A 1965 editorial in the 
New York Times stated, "Apart jrom the economic factor, it seems probable that even atter de 
Gaulle, the price of Britain's admission to 'Europe' will be concentration of its effort on the 
Continent and the fading out of any 'special relationship' with the United States. The final 
choice will be for Britain to make; but whichever way it goes, it will fundamentally affect the 
United States and Anglo-American relations. 
" 
Regardless of European problems, relations between the United States and Britain were 
still close. The British Foreign Secretary, George Brown, appeared at a Senate luncheon as a 
guest of President Johnson in October 1966. Brown was introduced by the Senate Majority 
leader, ". . . as a representative of 'one of our closest, if not our closest, ally. '. . . 
" Wilson 
publicly and privately continued to stress the importance of British membership in the EEC. To 
that the United States State Department replied, ". . . the United States long has favored a Europe 
that would be a pillar of equal economic strength in which Britain would play an important 
Lewis, Anthony. "Stronger Europe Urged by Wilson as Offset to US. 
" The New 1'ork Times December 1, 1966, 
pp- l. " 
"Britain's Defense Role. " Editorial. The New York T'rmes October 22, 1965, pp. 42. 
" Welles, Benjamin. "Brown Vows Help on Vietnam Peace. " The New York Times October 15, 1966, pp. 4. 
13 
part. '"' A letter from American politicians and university presidents appeared in The Times, 
London, in 1967. The letter stated, ". . . that the 'special relationship' between the United States 
and Britain should remain a fundamental part o f the two countries policy even if Britain enters 
the European Economic Community. " 
~~42 
Wilson and Johnson met in June of 1967, and after the meetings they spoke by telephone. 
Wilson stated, wOur sense of common purpose was indeed heartening. " 
' Johnson sent a 
telegram later that day and stated, "Your Iriendship, and that of the British people, is a great 
comfort in these troubled times. ' Relations between the two men, behind the scenes, were as 
cordial as ever. In 1968 Johnson and Wilson met in a much more public arena and Johnson 
welcomed Wilson with, ". . . assurances that 'the American people are backing Britain'. 
" ' A 
New York Times journalist further speculated that, "The interests of the two countries are bound 
to diverge now, more than they have. Their economic concerns are going to differ, and their 
political outlook. But there will remain a relationship special in indefinable but significant 
ways. " 
Richard Nixon took office as President of the United States in January 1969, and he met 
with Wilson in London in February. Upon arrival, "Mr. Nixon seemed animated and put his arm 
around the Prime Minister's shoulder several times during the airport ceremonies. 
" Nixon and 
Wilson apparently liked each other immediately because the relations with Wilson and Nixon 
" 
"No Washington Comment. " The New York Times December 1, 1966, pp. 11. 
" 
"American's Letter Stresses British Tie. " The New York Times February 21, 1967, pp. 5. 
" PRO. PREM 13/1906. "Phone-Patched to Department of State from Prime Minister. 
" to the President. 3 June 
1967. 
" PRO. PREM 13/1906. "Telegram 1'rom the President. " to the Prime Minister. 3 June 1967. 
Frankel, Max. "President Assures Wilson Americans 'Back Britain'. 
" The New York Times February 9, 1968, pp. 
1. 
Frankel, Max. *'President Assures Wilson Americans 'Back Britain'. 
" The New York Timer February 9, 1968, pp. 
l. 
' Sample, Robert, Jr. "Nixon Sees Wilson after Reassuring European Allies. 
" The New York Times February 25, 
1969, pp. l. 
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were to become much &iendlier than even those with Johnson. "The o fficial line &om Whitehall 
was that the talks with Prime Minister Wilson and his colleagues were exceedingly &iendly and 
that a good relationship had quickly been established. 
" Nixon was only in London for 39 
hours, but he quickly established his openness to the special relationship and willingness to 
continue it. Wilson went so far as to say that, "a 'close relationship' had been established. 
'" 
Why is the special relationship so special? An April 4, 1962, British internal document 
that originated &o m the Foreign Office and was marked confidential indicates that, "The sense of 
association between the British and Americans goes so deep, is felt at so many levels and yet is 
so intangible that neither are fully conscious of it. " The document further states that, "Constant 
exchanges of people, and their ideas, films, books, plays, etc. , keep the sense of association alive 
and developing. " ' This document was written for people within the British Government at the 
time, but it accurately demonstrated an understanding of the importance of the relationship and it 
is applicable even today. Jeremy Tunstall indicates the journalistic sentiment; "The 1960's were 
altogether a wonderful time to be a British foreign correspondent. . . . whatever the political 
realities might be. . . journalists felt that there was a special relationship between American and 
British journalism. "' In his 1968 Anglo-American Democracy, Malcolm Shaw states that, 
"When American Government is taught in American universities, there are, as a rule, more 
comparative references to British practice than to that of any other country. Likewise, when 
British Government is taught in British universities, there are generally more comparative 
Lewis, Anthony. "Nixon Stresses Trade and European Security in His Talks with British. 
" The New York Times 
February 26, 1969, pp. 14. 
" Mackintosh, John P. '"No 'special' relationship. 
" The Times, London 7 April 1969, pp. 6. 
PRO. PREM 11/5192. "Foreign Office Publication. 
" Distributed by A. C. I. Samuel of the Foreign Office. 4 April 
1962, pp. 6. 
" PRO. PREM 11/5192. "Foreign Office Publication. 
'* Distributed by A. C. I. Samuel of the Foreign Office. 4 April 
1962, pp. 6. 
" Tunstalt, Jeremy. Newspaper Power, The New National Press in JJraain Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996, pp. 344. 
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references to America than to any other country. 
" ' Shaw's statement adds one more facet to the 
significance of the relationship between Britain and the United States. The relationship is special 
because it is experienced by many people in many different occupations. 
An April 28, 1962, personal note by Prime Minister Macmillan about his conversation 
with President Kennedy earlier that day states that, 
". 
. . he [Kennedy] has learned a good deal since last year 
and events have so turned out as to make him, unless I am 
wholly mistaken, place more reliance on British good sense 
and advice than on anyone else. If this is so, a great deal of 
the credit is due to the Ambassador [Sir David Ormsby-Gore] 
whose relations with the White House are of course quite unique"" 
This is not to suggest that Kennedy was unable to trust anyone else, but rather that 
Kennedy trusted the British as a close ally and as reliable fiiends. After Kennedy and Macmillan 
met in December 1962, in Nassau to discuss the failure o f the planned Skybolt nuclear weapons 
and Kennedy offered the British Polaris nuclear weapons, Macmillan experienced political 
difficulties in London. Macmillan made no excuses for his difficulties in his letter thanking 
Kennedy for their talks in Nassau, however he did state, ". „I feel certain that the dust will soon 
begin to clear and that our agreement will become a historic example of the nice balance between 
interdependence and independence which is necessary if Sovereign states are to work in 
partnership together for the defence of freedom. "" In turn, Kennedy was so concerned about 
Macmillan's position that he sent transcripts of his own press conference so that Macmillan 
Shaw, Malcolm. Anglo-American Democracy. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968, pp. 1. 
PRO. PREM 1 1/3783. "Note by the Prime Minister of his conversation with President Kennedy on the morning 
of 
Saturday 28 April 1962 at the White House. 
" pp. 4. 
" PRO. PREM 11/4052. "Letter to John F. Kennedy. 
" 24 December 1962, pp. l. 
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could &eely quote his exact words. In his letter, Kennedy stated, "I noticed with sympathy that 
some of the first reactions in England did not reflect a full understanding of the real achievement 
of Nassau in blending independence and interdependence. But I am more and more convinced 
myself that together we have made a major step forward. . . 
"' Macmillan's &ee usage of the 
term interdependence and Kennedy's reply including it, marked a point where the two leaders 
fully recognized the special relationship and the fact that it was interdependent. Kennedy's use 
of the term also indicates a level of interdependence not fully recognized by previous U. S. 
Presidents. Sir David Ormsby-Gore was quoted in The Times of London, as saying of the 
Macmillan and Kennedy administrations, "I believe our two Governments are cooperating with 
each other more closely than any other two &ee and sovereign powers have ever done before in 
peace time. "" 
Where is the special relationship taking the United States and Britain? The special 
relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States has consistently been maintained 
at political, business, educational and cultural levels, and there is presently no indication that any 
of these levels should be, or will be abandoned any time soon. Dobson wrote, "There is a 
popular Atlantic cultural community, facilitated by a common language, by easy access to films 
and books and by buoyant tourist, commercial and educational intercourse. Britain is still the 
single most popular destination for US tourists outside the Western Hemisphere. 
"' Danchev*s 
closing sentence sums up his opinion of the state of the special relationship, "Requiescat in pace 
Anglo-America!" Since he considers the special relationship dead, he obviously must think that 
it has no future. Baylis argues that, "In the past Britain has been largely responsible for keeping 
PRO. PREM 11/4229. 'Teleprinter Letter to the Prime Minister. 
" &om John R Kennedy. 7 January 1963. 
'*Gold Medal for Gen. Eisenhower. " The Times, London. New York Correspondent. 23 May 1963, pp. 17. 
"Dobson. Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century. London: Routledge, 1995, pp. 169. 
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the relationship 'special'. " He continues, ". . . the future of the relationship also depends on 
whether the United States continues to be convinced of the value of the special relationship. 
" ' 
The consensus in Louis and Bull's edited volume is that the future of the special relationship is 
unclear and a prediction of its future unwise. The special relationship has produced many good 
Iriendships and it will continue to do so in the future, there are no indications that it will become 
less special. British membership in the European Union may limit the publicity given to the 
special relationship, as demonstrated by Wilson's actions in the late sixties, but there is no 
indication that the relationship will die in the near future. 
There are those who glorify the special relationship and those who despise it; this author 
believes the special relationship is a good thing for both countries but the relationship is not 
worthy of either great glory or great debasement. In a shrinking global community, Iriends that 
can be relied upon are a necessity; both countries owe something to the other. The historical 
precedent is but one facet to the special relationship but it provides a rich legacy upon which to 
base the present special relationship. The middle and late sixties have often been viewed as a 
time of decline in the relationship over the height and exuberance of the early sixties; however, 
the relationship is such that no President or Prime Minister alone can destroy its significance or 
importance. The only way to destroy the special relationship would be the destruction and utter 
annihilation of one or both countries and their people. 
The relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom during the nineteen 
sixties has been proven to be an interdependent one. Also, the many meetings and consultations 
and the multitude o f correspondence between the Presidents and Prime Ministers undoubtedly 
Dancbev. On Specialness, Essays in Anglo-American Relations. pp. 165. Translation: "Rest in peace, Anglo- 
America!" 
Baylis. Anglo-American Defence Relations 1939-1984, The Special Relaiionship. pp. 221. 
' Baylis. Anglo-American Defence Relations 1939-1984, The Special Relaiionship. pp. 221. 
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point to a relationship that was special. They relied on each other as triends and as great allies. 
The relationship is so special because the people of Britain and the people of the United States 
choose to keep it that way. The relationship has changed over the years, it has acquired new 
meanings and nuances, but it is still alive and healthy and it will continue to benefit the people of 
both nations. 
Louis, Roger. aud Hediey Bull, eds. The 'Special Relationship ', Anglo-American Relations Since l 945. Oxford'. 
Clareudou Press, 1989. 
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Appendix 
United States Presidents and United Kingdom Prime Ministers, 1960-1969 
20 January 53 
Dwight Eisenhower 
Republican 
13 January 57 
Harold Macmillan 
Conservative 
20 January 61 
John Kennedy 
Democrat 
22 November 63 
Lyndon Johnson 
Democrat 
20 January 69 
Richard Nixon 
Republican 
19 October 63 
Sir Alee Douglas-Home 
Conservative 
16 October 64 
Harold Wilson 
Labor 
" Dickie. 'Special'No More, Anglo-American Relations: Rhetoric and Reality, pp. 277, sod Alfred F. Havighutst. 
Britain in Transition, The Twentieth Century. 4 Ed. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1985, pp. 653. 
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